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64 
TITLE VII IS NOT THE ONLY CURE FOR 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF DOE v. MERCY 
CATHOLIC MEDICAL CENTER IN 
EXPANDING CLAIMS FOR MEDICAL 
RESIDENTS UNDER TITLE IX 
Abstract: In March 2017, in Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit established that medical residents, 
who function as both students and as employees of a hospital, could bring pri-
vate causes of action for sex discrimination under Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972. This ruling revived a long-standing split amongst the 
Circuits, with the Third Circuit parting company from the Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits and aligning with the First and Fourth Circuits, which hold Title VII’s 
carefully crafted administrative remedial procedure does not pre-empt claims 
under Title IX. This Comment argues that the Third Circuit’s decision to allow 
medical residents to bring Title IX claims furthers the goals of the legislation, 
which seeks to combat discrimination against minorities in education and, more 
specifically, to advance the number of women in professional fields such as law 
and medicine. Since successfully completing a medical residency program is a 
pre-requisite to practicing as a physician, it is important that U.S. courts give 
medical residents full access to the panoply of remedies available and allow dis-
cretion in bringing either a Title VII or Title IX discrimination claim. 
INTRODUCTION 
Civil rights legislation enacted throughout the 1960s was aimed at 
broadly protecting against discrimination, yet glaringly failed to address dis-
crimination against gender.1 In particular, women were being denied the req-
uisite educational opportunities to achieve professional careers in law and 
medicine.2 Congress passed Title IX of the Higher Education Amendments in 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972) (introducing Title IX and asserting that Congress has 
focused on eliminating discrimination against racial minorities but overlooked the vast discrimina-
tion against the majority of women which still exists within the educational sector); see also Fron-
tiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–85 (1973) (noting that the United States has a long history 
of discrimination against women, dating back to founding of the country). 
 2 See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on H.R. 16098 Before the Special Subcomm. 
on Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 91st Cong. 2, 562 (1971) [hereinafter Discrimina-
tion Against Women] (discussing the blatant discrimination against women within professional 
occupations and higher education admissions). The Subcommittee noted that in the United States, 
women constituted a small percentage of professional medical personnel, compared to in Russia, 
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1972 to combat gender discrimination in federally funded educational institu-
tions.3 The statute filled the gaps left by Title VI, which aimed to eliminate 
discrimination in federally financed programs, and Title VII, which aimed to 
protect against discrimination exclusively in the employment context.4 As 
Senator Evan Bayh noted during the Congressional discussion on Title IX, 
the goal of the amendment was to provide legal protection for women in 
higher education, particularly in the legal and medical professions.5 Since 
Title IX’s enactment, the disparity between the number of women and men in 
professional occupations such as law and medicine has significantly dimin-
ished.6 While the purpose of Title IX has traditionally been focused on equal-
izing educational opportunities, courts have continuously expanded its cover-
                                                                                                                           
where women constituted 65% of professional medical personnel. Id. at 522. The Subcommittee 
hearing also focused on a long-standing bias against women in medical school admissions. Id. 
 3 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012) (providing that no person will be subject to discrimination 
based on sex in a federally funded educational program or activity); 118 CONG. REC. 5806–07 
(stressing that Title IX would be a comprehensive measure designed to create equal economic 
opportunities for women in the workforce by providing women legal protection against discrimi-
nation in higher education). 
 4 See 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (noting that Title IX’s reach to educational facilities would serve 
to close the gap left by Title VII by extending protections against discrimination in admissions, 
faculty employment, and scholarships to “any person”); Kristen Galles, Filling the Gaps: Women, 
Civil Rights, and Title IX, 31 HUM. RTS. 16, 16 (2004) (noting that Title IX filled the gaps left by 
Title VI and Title VII, neither of which specifically address gender or discrimination in educa-
tion). Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (stating that Title VI broadly prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of race, national origin, and color within federally financed programs, notably excluding 
gender), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (stating that Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
sex, race, national origin, age, or color, but only within the employment context). Senator Bayh 
further noted that Title IX would carry a similar enforcement scheme to Title VI by terminating 
federal fund disbursement to those facilities found in violation. 118 CONG. REC. 5803. 
 5 See 118 CONG. REC. 5807 (stating that Title IX would provide needed legal protection for 
women within the educational field as Title VII does not extend protection to employees of educa-
tional facilities). As federal funds are often the primary source of funding for medical schools and 
training programs, Title IX’s singular remedial scheme of withholding funds provides incentives 
for compliance. See Graduate Medical Education, Ass’n Am. Med. Colls. (“AAMC”), https://
www.aamc.org/advocacy/gme/ [https://perma.cc/C83A-GNFN] (explaining that medical residents 
typically spend three to seven years in training programs funded by Medicare payments in the 
form of “direct graduate medical education payments”); see also Janet Lavelle, U.S. Faces Doctor 
Shortage—Some See a Crisis—Primary Care Is Expected to Be Hit Especially Hard, SAN DIEGO 
UNION TRIB., July 10, 2011, at A1 (claiming that capping federal funds for graduate medical edu-
cation to 1996 levels limits the number of doctors that can be trained, threatening a shortage of 
about 91,000 doctors nationwide by 2020). 
 6 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EQUAL ACCESS TO EDUCATION: FORTY YEARS OF TITLE IX 1–
2 (2012) (detailing Title IX’s positive impact on increasing female admission in higher education 
programs as the number of women enrolled in higher education programs has tripled since the 
statute’s passage); see also NaYoung Rim, The Effect of Title IX on Gender Disparity in Graduate 
Education 2 (Harris Sch. of Pub. Policy, Univ. of Chi., Working Paper I24, 2016) (finding that the 
passage of Title IX played a role in the increase of women in graduate and professional programs). 
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age to address employment discrimination in educational institutions.7 Thus, 
when bringing a gender discrimination claim against an educational institu-
tion, a disagreement exists amongst courts if Title VII’s carefully constructed 
administrative framework should pre-empt a plaintiff’s Title IX claim.8 
In March 2017, in Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a medical resident 
participating in a private hospital’s medical residency program could bring a 
Title IX claim against the hospital for employment discrimination based on 
sex.9 In reversing the lower court’s dismissal of these claims, the Third Cir-
cuit declined to follow the reasoning of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, in-
stead aligning itself with the First and Fourth Circuits.10 The Mercy II ruling 
                                                                                                                           
 7 See, e.g., MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, 3 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION 
§ 33:2 (2017) (discussing previous Supreme Court and Circuit Court decisions that expanded Title 
IX’s interpretation); see also Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975) 
(holding that even though Title VII originated as a comprehensive solution to employment dis-
crimination, a plaintiff is not limited to that statute for relief). 
 8 See Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. (Mercy II), 850 F.3d 545, 560 (2017) (finding that, 
unlike a student whose sole recourse is Title IX or an employee whose sole recourse is Title VII, a 
medical resident, who functions both as a student and an employee of the hospital, is not barred 
from bringing both a Title VII and Title IX claim); see also Kim Turner, The Rights of School 
Employee-Coaches Under Title VII and Title IX in Educational Athletic Programs, 32 A.B.A. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 229, 246–48 (2017) (providing an overview of the circuit split and reviewing the 
opinions of district courts in the First and Fourth circuits, where Title VII has been held to not pre-
empt Title IX, and a Fifth Circuit opinion which upheld Title VII pre-emption of Title IX). Com-
pare Ivan v. Kent State Univ., 92 F.3d 1185, 1185 n.10 (6th Cir. 1996) (overruling district court’s 
holding that “Title VII pre-empts an individual’s private remedy under Title IX” for gender dis-
crimination), Preston v. Commonwealth of Va. ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203, 208 
(4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a plaintiff can seek relief for a retaliatory employment discrimination 
claim under both Title VII and Title IX), and Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 896–97 (1st 
Cir. 1988) (holding that Title IX analysis for discriminatory treatment can apply to Title VII for 
gender discrimination in a university setting as courts have noted the statutes are analogous), with 
Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 758 (5th Cir. 1995), and Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Sch., 91 F.3d 
857, 862 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that Title VII’s comprehensive and detailed administrative 
scheme should pre-empt Title IX claims). 
 9 Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 560. The Third Circuit noted a medical residency—a period of train-
ing and clinical instruction after graduating from medical school—qualifies as a “program or ac-
tivity” under Title IX. Id. at 550, 555; see also ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE MED. 
EDUC. (“ACGME”), COMMON PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS 1 (2017) (naming medical residency as 
an essential educational component to transitioning from a medical student to a fully independent 
medical practitioner and outlining guidelines for teaching and training medical residents). Guide-
lines for medical residency training is overseen by the ACGME, a private, non-profit organization 
whose stated goal is to advance the quality of medical residency education, training, and educa-
tion. Id. See generally Intro to Main Residency Match, NAT’L RESIDENCY MATCHING PROGRAM 
(“NRMP”), http://www.nrmp.org/intro-to-main-residency-match/ [https://perma.cc/5H64-ETX7] 
(explaining how medical students are “matched” to their residency programs through a computer-
based algorithm). Unlike an employer-employee relationship, medical residents do not have the 
liberty of negotiating their place of work or salary, as they are “matched” to their respective teach-
ing hospitals based on a rank preference conducted through a central service, the NRMP. Id. 
 10 Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 555. The court reasoned that since the primary goal of Title IX was to 
eradicate gender discrimination in educational facilities that receive federal funding, a medical 
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revived the longstanding debate of whether Title VII remains the exclusive 
remedy for employees in federally funded institutions alleging sex discrim-
ination.11 As the courts have not considered this issue for almost twenty 
years, the question of whether a medical student can bring a Title IX rather 
than a Title VII claim is ripe for a Supreme Court ruling.12 
This Comment argues that the Third Circuit correctly aligned itself 
with the First and Fourth Circuits in holding that a medical resident is not 
limited to bringing a Title VII claim for employment discrimination and that 
a medical residency program qualifies as an educational program or activity 
subject to Title IX protections.13 The Third Circuit reasoned that Title VII 
and Title IX are distinct statutes providing different methods of due process 
to address discrimination, and a plaintiff is not limited to only utilizing Title 
VII to seek relief.14 In keeping with the Supreme Court’s broadly construed 
interpretation of Title IX, as well as the legislative intent, the Third Circuit’s 
liberal application of Title IX supports the statute’s policy goals of eradicat-
ing gender discrimination in higher education and the workforce.15 
Part I of this Comment develops the historical framework of Title IX 
and Title VII, and provides background information on the Third Circuit case 
that deepened the existing split circuit.16 Part II of this Comment discusses 
the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the word “education” and the guiding 
principles the court used to conclude that Title IX encompasses a medical 
                                                                                                                           
residency program qualifies as an educational “program or activity” under Title IX. Id. The Third 
Circuit noted that hospitals that provide medical residency programs qualify to receive federal 
Medicare funds to offer medical education and training programs. Id. at 556. An educational insti-
tution includes any “public or private elementary or secondary schooling,” as well as any voca-
tional, professional, or training institution that in whole or part receives financial assistance. 20 
U.S.C. § 1681(c) (2012). 
 11 See Fox v. Pittsburg State Univ., No. 14-CV-2606-JAR, 2017 WL 2734608, at *7, *9 (D. 
Kan. June 16, 2017) (finding that circuits are split on whether Title VII pre-empts Title IX). With-
out Tenth Circuit precedent, the district court aligned with the First, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Cir-
cuits in holding that Title VII is not the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination. Id. 
 12 See ROSSEIN, supra note 7 (discussing the Third Circuit’s revival of a long-standing split 
amongst the courts). The Supreme Court previously denied resolving whether Title VII pre-empts 
Title IX when it failed to grant certiorari for Lakoski. Id. at n.14; see also Doe v. Mercy Catholic 
Med. Ctr. (Mercy I), 158 F. Supp. 3d 256, 259 (E.D. Pa 2016) (identifying various interpretations 
of Title IX but finding no controlling Supreme Court or circuit court precedent). 
 13 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 555, 559 (holding that Mercy Catholic Hospital fits into the 
broader definition of an “education” program and the activities covered under Title IX); supra 
note 8 and accompanying text (comparing circuit court interpretations of whether Title VII pre-
empts Title IX). 
 14 See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (noting the numerous court opinions that have 
subsequently interpreted Title IX to apply broadly to employment claims in education). 
 15 See N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 509, 521 (1982) (holding that, in keeping with 
Congressional intent, Title IX’s application should be broadly applied); 118 CONG. REC. 5807 
(stating that Title IX would provide needed legal protection for women within the educational 
field as Title VII does not extend protection to employees of educational facilities). 
 16 See infra notes 21–56 and accompanying text. 
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residency program.17 Part III of this Comment analyzes whether Title VII pre-
empts Title IX, the implications of allowing medical residents to bring Title 
IX claims, and how the Third Circuit’s interpretation fits within Congress’ 
policy goals of eradicating gender discrimination in educational programs.18 
I. TITLE IX’S ORIGINS AND DOE V. MERCY CATHOLIC MEDICAL CENTER  
Section A of this Part discusses the inception of Title VII and Title IX 
and analyzes how courts have interpreted these statutes in relation to em-
ployment discrimination claims.19 Section B of this Part provides an over-
view of the procedural and factual history of Doe v. Mercy Catholic Hospi-
tal.20  
A. Origins and Interpretation of Title VII and Title IX 
In the wake of the nation’s push for civil rights reform in the 1960s, 
Congress enacted Title VII as the primary statute addressing employment 
discrimination claims.21 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it 
unlawful for employers to discriminate against any individual on the basis 
of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”22 Notably, Title VII has an 
extensive and carefully crafted administrative remedial procedure aimed at 
conciliation and making the victim “whole.”23 In order to state a claim for 
relief under Title VII, a plaintiff must file a charge with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 180 days of the discrimi-
                                                                                                                           
 17 See infra notes 57–66 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 67–86 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 21–48 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 49–56 and accompanying text. 
 21 See Joe Freeman, How Sex Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public 
Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 163, 169 (1991) (noting that Title VII came out of the Civil Rights hear-
ings on curbing racial discrimination). Title VII was not originally aimed at gender discrimination 
as the word “sex” was a last-minute amendment to Title VII’s final language. Id. at 163. It is de-
bated whether the addition was an attempt to kill the statute. Id. at 164. The proposal came from 
Howard Smith, a southern state representative, who vehemently opposed Title VII and had previ-
ously tried to block its passage. Id. at 177. 
 22 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 
(1971) (finding that Congress’ intent in enacting Title VII was to achieve equality within the 
workplace and combat historically discriminatory hiring practices). 
 23 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(1)(c) (outlining the timeframe for filing a claim and commencing 
proceedings); see Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287 (1998) (stating that 
Title VII aims to compensate victims and make them “whole” whereas Title IX is focused on 
protection); see also Douglas P. Ruth, Title VII & Title IX =? Is Title IX the Exclusive Remedy for 
Employment Discrimination in the Educational Sector?, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 185, 189 
(1996) (stating that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII to add compensatory and puni-
tive damages awards for plaintiffs subjected to employment discrimination). 
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natory act.24 The EEOC is charged with assessing the claim.25 From the date 
of filing (which also serves to provide notice to the employer), the EEOC 
then has 180 days to prompt negotiation and settlement if they find a proba-
ble cause of action exists.26 If the EEOC finds no grounds for discrimina-
tion, it will issue a dismissal.27 This administrative procedure does not 
completely bar a plaintiff’s access to court; the plaintiff can still request a 
right to sue letter if the negotiation and settlement options fail.28 
Congress and President Nixon signed into law Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972 in order to address gender discrimination in edu-
cation.29 Title IX provides that no person will be subjected to discrimination 
on the basis of sex in any “educational program or activity” that is a recipi-
ent of federal funds.30 Congress enacted Title IX as a floor amendment with 
                                                                                                                           
 24 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). The Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (“EEOC”) was 
created in 1965 to address employment discrimination and carry out the uniform enforcement of 
Title VII. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, OVERCOMING THE PAST, FOCUSING ON THE FU-
TURE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION’S EN-
FORCEMENT EFFORTS 1–5 (2000) [hereinafter OVERCOMING THE PAST] (providing an overview of 
the formation and activities of the EEOC). The agency was originally conceived as purely admin-
istrative and lacked the authority to litigate claims until 1972. See DONALD LIVINGSTON, EEOC 
LITIGATION AND CHANGE RESOLUTION 4–13 (2d ed. 2014) (discussing the debates resulting in 
EEOC initially being charged with conciliatory rather than prosecutorial authority). The Equal 
Opportunity Act of 1972 later gave the agency the power to sue private actors. Id. at 12. The 
agency is primarily charged with enforcing the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act of 1978, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. OVERCOMING THE PAST, supra at 1–2. See 
generally Overview, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/ADR6-H4UR] 
(overviewing the agency’s functions and identifying its goal of preventing discrimination through 
outreach, education, and technical assistance).  
 25 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) 
 26 Id.; id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
 27 Id. § 2000e-5(b). See generally Roy L. Brooks, A Roadmap Through Title VII’s Procedural 
& Remedial Labyrinth, 24. S.U. L. REV. 511, 516 (1995) (explaining Title VII’s complex remedial 
administrative procedure). 
 28 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). If the EEOC finds cause for the complaint, the commission has 
thirty days to try to settle the dispute. Id.; see also Ruth, supra note 23, at 188 (outlining the ad-
ministrative and enforcement provisions a plaintiff must exhaust before seeking redress from the 
courts under Title VII). A right to sue letter is required before a plaintiff may file a private cause 
of action. Ruth, supra note 23, at 188. 
 29 See Susan Perry, How Title IX Helped Make Women’s Dreams of Becoming Doctors a 
Reality, MINNPOST (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.minnpost.com/second-opinion/2017/01/how-title-
ix-helped-make-womens-dreams-becoming-doctors-reality [https://perma.cc/K4JJ-CB7D] (asserting 
that the passage of Title IX helped more women enter the medical profession); supra notes 1–2 
and accompanying text (discussing the need for legal protection for women against discrimination 
in education). Two years after Title IX’s passage, the number of women entering medical schools 
increased by about 22%. Perry, supra. While Title IX has eradicated much of discrimination in 
medical school admissions, the author notes that female physicians still earn less than their male 
counterparts by an average of $17,000, signaling the profession’s lasting gender bias. Id.  
 30 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Title IX’s broad proclamation of prohibition is followed by listing a 
number of exempt institutions, including: religious institutions, military service camps, public 
70 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
two primary goals: (1) preventing federal resources from supporting gender 
discrimination in education programs and (2) affording individual citizens 
effective protection against such practices.31 In order to enforce compliance, 
the sole remedial measure apparent in Title IX is the withdrawal of federal 
funds if an educational program or activity is found to be in violation of the 
statute.32 
As Title IX was enacted to specifically address gender discrimination 
in education, a key point of contention when addressing employment dis-
crimination claims is the relationship between Title IX and Title VII.33 
Courts have noted the marked distinctions between the legislative intentions 
                                                                                                                           
educational institutions that have an established policy of only admitting one sex, fraternities and 
sororities, boy and girl scouts, “mother-daughter and father-son outings,” and “beauty pageants.” 
Id. 
 31 Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979). To support their statement of Title IX’s 
twin aims, the Court noted that Title IX’s enforcement scheme of withholding federal funds mir-
rored that of Title VI’s. Id. Title IX was enacted as a floor amendment; therefore, no committee 
reports exist, and courts have instead relied on remarks from Senator Bayh, who spearheaded the 
proposal, exclaiming that the “heart of the amendment” is prohibiting gender discrimination in 
educational programs receiving federal funds, which would effectively extend the equal employ-
ment opportunities provisions in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 
524 (noting that when Senator Bayh introduced Title IX, the goal was eliminating all discrimina-
tion in educational facilities including employment practices). 
 32 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (explaining that failure to comply with Title IX results in the removal of 
funds from the particular program not in compliance). The Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare (“HEW”) is the federal agency tasked with issuing regulations to enforce Title IX com-
pliance. See N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 515–16 (explaining that HEW took over reviewing Title IX 
claims in 1979). Under the “pinpoint” provision, funds are withdrawn only from the program that 
is not in compliance. 20 U.S.C. § 1682. The purpose of the pinpoint provision was not to punish 
innocent bystanders or the entire institution for an individual group or program not in compliance. 
See Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Taylor Cty. v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1077 (5th Cir. 1969) (vacating 
HEW’s decision to terminate funding and relying on Congress’ intent to limit the withdrawal of 
federal funds). There is a four-step process to withdraw federal funds from a recipient: (1) the 
recipient must be notified they are not in compliance with the statute in order to achieve voluntary 
compliance; (2) once an agency has had an opportunity for a hearing and notice, a department 
official will make a finding of noncompliance; (3) the head of the agency will decide whether or 
not to approve the suspension of funding; and (4) the head of the agency must file a report with 
the House and Senate legislative committees that oversee the programs involved and wait thirty 
days before withdrawing funds. See Title IX Legal Manuel: Fund Suspension & Termination, 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/crt/title-ix#122 [https://perma.cc/
DXS6-QN7L] (outlining the scope of Title IX and the steps taken before withdrawing federal 
funds). 
 33 See Lakoski, 66 F.3d 751, 756 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that even though Title VII and Title 
IX protect individuals from employment discrimination on the basis of sex, Title VII expressly 
excluded educational institutions from its purview when Title IX was enacted); Lonnie D. Giame-
la, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments, 3 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 439, 448 (2002) (stating 
that Title VII’s administrative procedure is markedly absent from Title IX which allows a plaintiff 
to seek immediate judicial redress without first having to file claims with the EEOC or exhaust 
other administrative procedures); see also Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 834 (1976) 
(claiming that in a variety of contexts courts have held that a detailed statute should pre-empt a 
more general statute). 
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and interpretations of the two statutes.34 Title IX’s broad language is mod-
eled after Title VI, and Title IX was similarly enacted under Congress 
spending power, acting as  a protective measure for individuals at institu-
tions that receive federal funding.35 In order to terminate federal funding, 
Title IX requires an express finding of an institution’s failure to comply 
with the statutory requirements.36 
By comparison, Title VII is an outright prohibition against discriminato-
ry conduct across all employment fields.37 In 1998, in Gebster v. Lago Vista 
Independent School District, the Supreme Court held that Title VII applies to 
all employers, without regard to federal funding, and aims to broadly eradi-
cate discrimination in employment contexts.38 Title VII seeks to make plain-
tiffs “whole” by compensating them through monetary damages.39 Title VII’s 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286–87 (distinguishing Title IX’s contractual framework which 
acts as a condition on federal funding with Title VII’s administrative framework that seeks to 
make victims “whole”). Compare Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459 (finding that Title VII’s comprehen-
sive design does not necessarily preclude plaintiffs from seeking other forms of redress), and N. 
Haven, 456 U.S. at 524 (concluding that Title IX’s legislative history indicates it was meant to 
expand Title VII’s reach to employment discrimination within the educational realm), with Lako-
ski, 66 F.3d at 755 (noting that Title VII’s comprehensive and detailed administrative scheme 
should pre-empt Title IX’s more general remedy). 
 35 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286 (noting that Title IX and Title VI both act as a form of agreement: 
by accepting federal funds, the educational organization or institution agrees to abide by the stat-
ute); see Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 552 (citing that Title IX’s enactment under the Spending Clause 
effectively makes the statute function like an agreement between the federal government and the 
recipient); see also Editors, Implementing Title IX: The HEW Regulations, 124 U. PA. L REV. 806, 
809 (1975) (stating that Title IX’s absolute prohibition against discrimination is identical to Title 
VI’s language, but Title IX is limited to education). Even though Title IX’s language mirrors that 
of Title VI, Title IX exempts certain educational institutions and admissions procedures whereas 
Title VI’s reach is not confined. See Editors, supra, at 810 (claiming that Title IX’s exemptions 
illustrate Congress viewed race and sex differently as Title VI has no exemptions). Title VI was 
enacted in 1964 as the first broad protection against racial discrimination by denying those institu-
tions found in violation from receiving federal funding. See Title VI Legal Manuel: Synopsis of 
Legislative History & Purpose of Title VI, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/crt/fcs/T6
manual2#_ftn3 [https://perma.cc/M4RY-SWQS] (last updated Jan. 25, 2017) (overviewing history 
and goals of Title VI). The text of Title VI provides broad protection against discrimination on the 
basis of race, national origin, or color at any program or institution that receives federal funding. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000d. The goal of Title VI was to ensure a uniform policy to eradicate racial discrim-
ination. See 110 CONG. REC. 6544 (1964) (discussing the reasons for federal legislation to effec-
tively combat racial discrimination and end segregation). See generally Paul Easton, Note, School 
Attrition Through Enforcement: Title VI Disparate Impact and Verification of Student Immigrant 
Status, 54 B.C. L. REV. 313 (2013) (discussing the history of equal protection and segregation as 
an impetus for Congress enacting Title VI).  
 36 20 U.S.C. § 1682. 
 37 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 553 (noting that Title VII is rooted in both the Commerce Clause 
and the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 38 See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286 (claiming that Title IX’s contractual framework is a key dis-
tinguishing feature from Title VII’s complex structure framed as an outright prohibition). 
 39 See id. at 287 (comparing Title VII’s goal of compensating individuals and the statute’s 
retroactive nature to Title IX’s proactive nature of protecting individuals from discrimination). 
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administrative procedure and promotion of conciliation is markedly absent 
from Title IX’s general remedial structure.40 
Moreover, even though Title IX was not originally viewed as applica-
ble to employment, several Supreme Court decisions have recognized an 
implied private right of action, effectively broadening Title IX’s reach.41 In 
1979, in Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Supreme Court recognized a 
private right of action under Title IX for a plaintiff claiming gender discrim-
ination after being denied admission to the medical schools at University of 
Chicago and Northwestern University.42 Looking to Title IX’s legislative 
history, the court found that since Title IX was patterned after Title VI, there 
existed an implied private right of action which served Title IX’s broader 
purpose of eradicating gender discrimination in education.43 
The Third Circuit also relied on the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in 
North Haven Board of Education v. Bell which established that while Title 
IX does not expressly authorize a private right of action, it is implied given 
the statute’s broad directive.44 In North Haven, two public, federally funded 
                                                                                                                           
 40 See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (providing only one remedy for Title IX violation); see also Ruth, 
supra note 23, at 190 (discussing the significant differences between Title VII and Title IX’s en-
forcement and remedial procedures). 
 41 See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 72 (1992) (finding that all remedies 
are available to a plaintiff discriminated against on the basis of sex, including money damages 
under Title IX); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 703, 709 (holding implied private right of action under Title 
IX against universities receiving federal funding); Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459 (holding that a private 
sector employee is neither deprived of other remedies nor limited to Title VII for relief). No lan-
guage in Title IX expressly authorizes a plaintiff to bring a private cause of action to obtain relief 
in federal court. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 683. The Court found the private cause of action was implied 
in Title IX’s language as it aligns with Congressional intent. Id. at 717. 
 42 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at (claiming that lack of an express authorization of a private remedy 
does not necessarily indicate Congress meant to make that remedy unavailable). Central to the 
court’s decision were the similarities of Title VI and Title IX. Id. at 696. Title IX was patterned 
after Title VI in both the language describing the benefited classes and the administrative scheme 
to terminate federal funding to those found in violation. Id. The Court held that when Title IX was 
enacted, Title VI had already been construed as allowing a private remedy, and this application 
had been widely accepted by federal courts. Id. 
 43 Id. at 689. In order to find a private right of action, the Court looked to the four factors 
established in Cort v. Ash to decide if Congress meant to allow or imply as much. See id. at 688 
(citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)). The four factors include: (1) whether plaintiff is part 
of the class covered under the statute, (2) legislative history, (3) whether finding a private cause of 
action undermines legislative goal enacting the statute, and (4) whether a federal remedy oversteps 
into an area of state concern. See id. at 689–708. Applying these factors, the Court found a private 
right of action, as the plaintiff was within the protected class and the availability of attorney fees 
for actions brought against public educational agencies in Title VI assumes the availability of a 
private remedy in Title IX, whose language mirrors that of Title VI. Id. at 709. Central to the 
Court’s holding was finding that the plaintiff fit within the class designated under Title IX which 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex against “persons,” as well as the similarities between 
Title VI and Title IX. See id. at 694. 
 44 N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 521 (holding that Title IX’s broad language similarly calls for a 
broad interpretation despite the absence of an express private right of action in the text). 
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schools filed suit claiming they did not come under Title IX’s purview, as 
the statute was not intended to cover employment practices in educational 
facilities.45 The Court found that even though Title IX does not directly ex-
clude employees, the debate surrounding the statute’s enactment indicated 
that  Title IX was not intended to be limiting, but rather widely encompass-
ing.46 The Court noted that Congress could have inserted “student” or “ben-
eficiary” instead of “person” if the legislature wanted to expressly limit the 
scope of Title IX.47 Since the Supreme Court’s decision in North Haven, 
lower courts have generally adhered to broadly interpreting Title IX’s appli-
cation to employment discrimination claims and not limited plaintiffs’ ave-
nue of relief to Title VII.48 
B. Factual and Procedural History of Doe v. Mercy  
Catholic Medical Center 
On April 20, 2015, the plaintiff, proceeding anonymously as Jane Doe, 
sued Mercy Catholic Medical Center (“Mercy”), a private hospital, in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania two years after her dismissal from a medi-
cal residency program, alleging six claims: three claims under Title IX—
retaliation, quid pro quo, and hostile environment—as well as three state 
law claims.49 The plaintiff joined Mercy’s diagnostic radiology residency 
program in 2011 as a second-year resident and claimed the director of the 
residency program, Dr. James Roe, sexually harassed her and then retaliated 
against her for complaining about his behavior.50 The plaintiff did not file 
                                                                                                                           
 45 Id. at 517–18. Looking to the statute’s history, the Court held that employees who benefit 
from federal grants or contracts, such as the teachers in federally funded schools, fall within Title 
IX’s discretion. Id. at 520. 
 46 Id. at 521–22; 544 (reviewing Title IX’s legislative history and concluding that Congress 
did not attempt to limit Title IX’s expansive language). 
 47 Id. at 521. The Court further elaborated that Congress thwarted attempts to limit Title IX’s 
scope by rejecting a proposal that would have exempted employees of educational institutions 
from Title IX’s protection. Id. at 534. 
 48 See Fox, 2017 WL 2734608, at *6–7 (holding that Title VII is not the exclusive remedy for 
employment discrimination)); Winter v. Pa. State Univ., 172 F. Supp. 3d 756, 773–74 (M.D. Pa. 
2016) (finding that Cannon and N. Haven broadened Title IX’s reach and therefore Title VII did 
not pre-empt a discrimination claim brought under Title IX). 
 49 Mercy I, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 257. The plaintiff’s (“Doe”) state law claims of contract-based 
gender discrimination, wrongful termination, and breach of covenant of good faith were summari-
ly dismissed without prejudice. Id. The district court also held that the continuing violation claim 
was time barred, as Title IX claims have a two-year statute of limitations. Id. at 262. The district 
court noted the continuing violations doctrine is an equitable exception to the timely filing re-
quirement, but the doctrine did not apply here since there were only two isolated incidents. Id. The 
court questioned, however, whether this Title VII legal theory even applies for Title IX cases. Id. 
 50 Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 550. The plaintiff claimed the defendant, Dr. James Roe (“Roe”), 
inquired about her personal life when she was living apart from her husband and expressed inter-
est in meeting while the two of them attended a conference in Chicago. Id. The plaintiff sent mes-
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Title VII charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”).51 
The district court upheld the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding 
that Title IX does not apply to Mercy because it does not qualify as an “ed-
ucation program or activity” under 20 U.S.C § 1681(a).52 The district court 
further alleged that even if the plaintiff could bring Title IX claims, she 
could not use Title IX to circumvent time-barred Title VII claims.53 
The plaintiff timely appealed to the Third Circuit, which affirmed in 
part holding that the Title IX hostile work environment claim was time 
barred, reversed in part holding that the plaintiff could bring Title IX retalia-
tion and quid pro quo claims, and remanded the case for further proceed-
ings.54 The Third Circuit upheld the plaintiff’s claim that medical residents 
                                                                                                                           
sages stating that she wanted to keep a professional relationship, and Roe apparently reported 
these messages to the human resources department, who met with Roe after these allegations. Id. 
Roe also touched the plaintiff’s hand at work and stated that the unwelcome sexual attention nega-
tively impacted her experience; the human resources recommended the plaintiff to a psychiatrist. 
Id. at 551. Roe’s overtures intensified in the fall of 2012 upon learning that both of them were 
getting divorced, claiming that he wanted a relationship and on one instance reached across her 
body and pressed his arm against her breast during work. Id. Rejecting his advances, Roe retaliat-
ed by giving the plaintiff poor recommendations for fellowship applications and removed her 
name from a research paper that she helped author. Id. The plaintiff complained to human re-
sources and was again referred to a psychiatrist. Id. After receiving a letter of termination, Doe 
appealed the decision four days later, but the dismissal was upheld, and the plaintiff left the pro-
gram. Id. 
 51 See Mercy I, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 258, 261 (acknowledging that Title VII requires action 
within 180 days whereas Title IX’s two-year statute of limitations only allowed plaintiff’s Title IX 
claim). 
 52 See id. at 259–60. Central to the district court’s decision that residents are employees was that 
residents do not pay tuition or receive a degree, are paid for their services, and are protected by state 
labor laws and boards. See id. at 259; see also Employees Under the National Labor Relations Board, 
ACGME (Mar. 1, 2000), http://www.acgme.org/About-Us/Publications-and-Resources/Archived-
Papers/Position-Papers/Employees-Under-the-National-Labor-Relations-Act [https://perma.cc/3KFX-
L6EU] (discussing the National Labor Relations Board decision in 2010 which designated medical 
residents as employees to afford them protection under state laws for collective bargaining and 
joining labor unions). Further, the court noted there are significant differences between medical 
students and medical residents, including payment for patient care services. Mercy I, 158 F. Supp. 
3d at 259–60. Despite some educational components, the court claimed Congress only intended 
Title IX to narrowly apply to “education” programs within the realm of schools. Id. The court 
concluded that simply because the training medical residents received was educational, it did not 
necessarily convert the entire program into an “educational program” as originally conceived 
under Title IX. Id. at 260. The court found professional relationship, rather than an educational 
relationship, more applicable to a medical resident and determined the claims should be governed 
by Title VII. Id. at 259.  
 53 See Mercy I, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 261 (concluding that without congressional authorization 
for Title IX plaintiffs to be exempted from Title VII’s administrative procedure, plaintiffs should 
not be allowed to circumvent carefully structured procedures when their claims would otherwise 
be time barred). 
 54 Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 549. Quid pro quo claims are traditionally analyzed under Title VII 
legal theories. See id. at 564 (holding that employees are not barred from pursuing claims under 
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can bring private claims of action under Title IX by finding that such claims 
are a “mixed question of law and fact,” thereby significantly broadening 
Title IX’s scope.55 The issue of whether a medical residency program can be 
classified as “educational” under Title IX was a matter of first impression.56 
II. A MEDICAL RESIDENCY PROGRAM QUALIFIES AS  
“EDUCATIONAL” UNDER TITLE IX 
The Third Circuit’s ruling in Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center re-
lied heavily on a broad interpretation of Title IX in holding that a medical 
resident was not barred from bringing a private right of action.57 The deci-
                                                                                                                           
both Title VII and Title IX). The Third Circuit held that the plaintiff was not barred from bringing 
a quid pro quo claim. Id. While the Third Circuit acknowledged the Supreme Court had yet to 
extend Cannon’s implied private right of action claims to quid pro quo claims, the Third Circuit 
reasoned that barring this claim would be against the Court’s continuous holdings of applying a 
broad interpretation of Title IX in other contexts. See id. at 564–65 (noting that Title IX was en-
acted to cover a wide range of discrimination). The court reasoned quid pro quo claims are explicit 
in sexual discrimination claims, as adverse actions generally result from the subordinate refusing 
to submit to a supervisor or manager’s sexual advances. See id. at 565. In support of its holding, 
the court found the First Circuit in Lipsett impliedly recognized a medical resident’s ability to 
bring a quid pro quo claim. Id.; see Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 897 (1988) (acknowledging that the plain-
tiff, a medical resident, qualifies as both a student and an employee). But see Mercy I, 158 F. 
Supp. 3d at 259 n.1. (reasoning that the Supreme Court’s decision in Gebser substantially abrogat-
ed the First Circuit’s decision in Lipsett). The district court concluded Title IX could not be equat-
ed to Title VII, as there were substantial differences in Title VII and Title IX statutes and their 
mechanisms for relief. Mercy I, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 261. 
 55 Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 556. The Third Circuit conceded that a medical resident can qualify 
as an employee under Title VII by applying the factors for determining employment from Nation-
wide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden. Id. at 559 (citing Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 
503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992)). The factors include: whether Mercy was a “source of instrumentalities 
and tools of [the plaintiff’s] work,” how the plaintiff was assigned work, how long she worked at 
Mercy, how she was paid, her role in hiring, and her role in Mercy’s primary business of adminis-
tering healthcare services. Id. 
 56 See id. at 552 (deciding whether medical residency programs are subject to Title IX is a 
question of first impression). Prior to the Mercy I decision, no court had considered whether a 
medical residency program qualified as an “educational program or activity” under Title IX. Mer-
cy I, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 259.  
 57 Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. (Mercy II), 850 F.3d 545, 563 (3d Cir. 2017). The Third 
Circuit relied on six Supreme Court decisions that called for a broad application of Title IX. Id. at 
560. See Jackson v. Birmingham, 544 U.S. 167, 180 (2005) (holding that Congress intended to 
prevent and protect individuals against gender discrimination, and if plaintiffs who reported Title 
IX violations could not bring private actions for retaliation, it would deter reporting); Franklin v. 
Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (finding monetary damages available to a plain-
tiff discriminated against on the basis of sex under Title IX); N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 
U.S. 509, 536 n.26 (1982) (holding that Congress provided numerous different remedies to protect 
individuals against employment discrimination); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 
(1979) (finding that Congress intended an implied private remedy under Title IX); Brown v. Gen. 
Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 833 (1976) (emphasizing that the Court’s decision in Johnson that 
Title VII did not pre-empt other remedies applied only to private, and not federal, employment); 
Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975) (finding that Title VII’s compre-
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sion furthered a long standing split among the circuits: aligning the Third 
Circuit with the First and the Fourth Circuits and parting with the Fifth and 
Seventh Circuits, which hold that Title VII provides the exclusive remedy 
for gender discrimination in the workplace.58 As courts have not decided 
this issue of pre-emption, it is ripe for a Supreme Court ruling.59 
Before reconciling the tension between Title VII and Title IX, the 
Third Circuit first addressed whether a medical resident fit within the defi-
nition of “education” under Title IX.60 Interestingly, the Supreme Court has 
yet to define the meaning of “education” and reconcile the general language 
of “program and activity” with the modifier “education” in 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1681(a) (1972).61 To define education, the Third Circuit looked to Con-
gress’ intent, specifically its disagreement with the Supreme Court’s 1984 
decision in Grove City College v. Bell, where the Court narrowly read the 
phrase “education program or activity” to conclude that federal funding on-
ly applied to certain parts of the organization and did not extend to the en-
                                                                                                                           
hensive design does not preclude plaintiffs from seeking other forms of redress under federal stat-
utes). 
 58 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing Fifth and Seventh Circuit decisions 
holding that Title VII pre-empts Title IX discrimination claims unlike the First and Fourth Circuits 
which hold that plaintiffs are not limited to Title VII remedies). 
 59 See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text (noting that the court has yet to resolve 
whether Title VII pre-empts Title IX employment discrimination claims). 
 60 Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 553. The Third Circuit went further than previous courts by defining 
the limits of the term “education” and establishing a non-exhaustive list of four factors that can be 
used to determine whether a program is “educational.” Id. at 556. Noting that this list is not ex-
haustive, the court named the following features to be considered: (1) the structure of a program 
(either part-time or full-time), (2) if a program provides a certification or degree based on training, 
(3) if a program has instructors, a grading system, or accepts tuition, or (4) the program is accred-
ited through an organization or entity. Id. Applying these factors, the court held that the medical 
residency program qualifies as educational because it is affiliated with Drexel University, accred-
ited by the ACGME, has a mission that is in part educational, and provides a structured teaching 
program to receive the training necessary to become a certified doctor. Id. at 556–57. The Third 
Circuit focused on the fact that Mercy held itself out as an educational program, calling its resi-
dency program a “structured educational experience.” Id. at 557. 
 61 See id. at 554 (finding that case law offers little guidance for the definition and interpreta-
tion of education). The district court surmised that Congress meant to confine Title IX’s applica-
tion to the realm of “schooling” by keeping education as a modifier for “programs and activities.” 
See Doe v. Mercy Catholic Hosp. (Mercy I), 158 F. Supp. 3d 256, 260 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (stating 
without the “education” modifier, Title IX could potentially include any program or experience 
that involved any degree of learning or obtaining knowledge). The Third Circuit disagreed with 
the district court’s analysis by indicating that Congress distinctly defined “educational institu-
tions” that did not come under Title IX’s purview, which shows Congressional intent for “educa-
tion” to extend beyond the narrow interpretation of traditional schooling facilities and apply 
broadly to programs with educational components. See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 554. Congress only 
used “educational institution” to indicate where Title IX did not control. Id. Since Congress ex-
plicitly exempted fraternities, military academics, religious schools, the YMCA, and the Girl 
Scouts from Title IX, Congress did not mean to confine Title IX to institutions “in the sense of 
schooling.” Id. 
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tire institution.62 In response to this ruling, Congress enacted the Civil 
Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (“CRRA”), which broadly defined the 
phrase “program or activity” to encompass all operations that receive feder-
al funding.63 
Looking to the Second Circuit’s decision in 1997 in O’Connor v. Da-
vis, the Third Circuit similarly held that an “education program or activity” 
is one whose program characteristics comport to having an educational pur-
pose.64 The Third Circuit stated that this broader reading aligns with the 
Eighth and Ninth Circuit decisions applying Title IX to state prison systems 
that offered inmates educational programs, as well as a First Circuit deci-
sion that held a medical residency program fell under Title IX’s purview.65 
                                                                                                                           
 62 See id. at 553 (citing Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573 (1984)) (finding that the 
Congressional action of passing subsequent legislation to reverse the Grove City College holding 
provides support for Congressional intent of a broad application of Title IX). Only the federal aid 
program that received federal funds came under Title IX’s reach, not the entire college. Grove 
City Coll., 465 U.S. at 573. By narrowly interpreting the phrase “program or activity,” the Court 
held that the athletic program, which did not directly receive funding, was not subject to Title IX 
regulations. Id. at 574. 
 63 See 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2012) (defining program or activity for the purposes of Title IX). 
The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (“CRRA”) further defined the term “program or activi-
ty” to include the following: state or local government institutions, college, universities, any insti-
tutions of higher educational learning or educational school systems, corporations, partnerships, or 
private organizations that receive federal funding “as a whole” or are “principally engaged in the 
business of providing education, healthcare, housing, social services, or parks, and recreation.” 
See id. (covering specifically any entity that provides education or healthcare services); see also 
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 466 (1999) (holding that Congress’s pas-
sage of the CRRA deemed to define program and activity under Title IX to extend institution 
wide); Michael P. Villalobos, The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987: Revitalization of Title IX, 
1 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 149, 162 (1990) (finding that Congress passed the CRRA in order to 
restore Title IX’s institutional, rather than program specific, focus). The Grove City College deci-
sion effectively held that unless the athletic department directly received federal funding, it was 
not subject to Title IX regulations. Villalobos, supra at 158. After the Grove City College deci-
sion, at least 674 Title IX complaints were dismissed. Id. at 161. To combat this problem, the 
CRRA changed the wording of the statute to include any recipient of federal funding in order for 
the entire institution to be held accountable under Title IX. Id. at 162. 
 64 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 555 (finding that an education program or activity is classified as 
one that reasonably could be said to have some educational mission or purpose); O’Connor v. 
Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that a student who volunteered at a hospital 
could not bring a Title IX claim because the hospital’s primary purpose was not educational, nor 
did it fit into an educational program or activity under Title IX). To support its contention that 
Mercy can be subject to Title IX, the Third Circuit distinguished the hospital in O’Connor from a 
teaching hospital like Mercy, which combines employment with medical training for residents. 
Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 555. 
 65 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 555 (finding that circuit opinions support the court’s conclusion 
that Title IX was meant to extend beyond the traditional realm of schooling); Roubideax v. N.D. 
Dep’t of Corr., 570 F.3d 966, 976–78 (8th Cir. 2009) (affirming that Title IX applies to prisons 
and vocational education programs); Klinger v. Dep’t of Corr., 107 F.3d 609, 613–15 (8th Cir. 
1997) (finding that prisons were not exempted from Title IX); Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 
1224–26 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that Title IX is not meant to apply solely to traditional schooling 
programs). To further support a broad interpretation, the court also considered that twenty-one 
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The Third Circuit concluded by noting that whether a program can be 
deemed “educational” is a mixed question of law and fact, which leaves 
open the door for the Supreme Court to affirmatively define the term.66 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF MEDICAL RESIDENTS’ ABILITY TO  
BRING TITLE IX CLAIMS 
By classifying a medical residency program as subject to Title IX, the 
Third Circuit aligned itself with the legislature’s overarching policy objec-
tive of advancing women in education.67 The Third Circuit identified four 
principles from previous Supreme Court decisions that provided the basis 
for expanding Title IX as a concurrent remedy to Title VII: (1) plaintiffs are 
not limited to Title VII as their only means of redress for employment dis-
crimination; (2) whether plaintiffs can use Title IX to circumvent Title VII’s 
exhaustive administrative procedure is a question for Congress and not for 
the courts; (3) the implied private right of action in Title IX’s statute applies 
to both employees and students; and (4) this implied private right of action 
extends to employees in federally funded education programs.68 
Although the Third Circuit concluded that whether Title VII’s adminis-
trative framework should pre-empt Title IX is a congressional policy ques-
tion, this question of pre-emption is not new.69 Courts have long recognized 
                                                                                                                           
federal agencies, including the Department of Education and Health and Human Services, broadly 
interpreted the term “educational program or activity” to apply to “any education program or ac-
tivity” whether or not it was affiliated with an educational institution. Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 555 
 66 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 556 (indicating that when the facts are not contested, the question 
of whether a program falls under Title IX will be decided by a judge, whereas a jury will decide a 
factual dispute). 
 67 See 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (remarking that a “failure” of the American education system is 
its discrimination against women); see also Discrimination Against Women, supra note 2, at 518–
20 (discussing that four medical schools openly proclaimed to discriminate against women). The 
committee members indicated federal funds were the “lifeblood” of medical schools and residency 
programs, accounting for over half of all training expenditures. Discrimination Against Women, 
supra note 2, at 520. 
 68 See Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. (Mercy II), 850 F.3d 545, 560 (relying on prior Su-
preme Court decisions to expand Title IX’s reach). 
 69 See Fox v. Pittsburg State Univ., No. 14-CV-2606-JAR, 2017 WL 2734608, at *6, *7 (D. 
Kan. June 16, 2017) (stating that the issue of whether Title VII pre-empts Title IX remains unset-
tled); Ruth, supra note 23, at 198 (discussing the implications of whether Title VII should pre-
empt Title IX); see also N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 509, 543 (1982) (Powell, J., 
dissenting) (discussing tension between Title VII and Title IX, noting that unlike Title VII, Title 
IX makes no reference to employment). Justice Powell disagreed that Title IX’s use of the word 
“person” should be so broadly construed. N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 543. He stated that a plain reading 
of the statute confines Title IX’s application to direct beneficiaries, such as students enrolled in the 
program rather than janitors working at the school. Id. at 541. He further believed that the court 
overlooked the importance of Title IX mirroring Title VI’s construction. Id. at 546. In particular, 
Title IX was enacted to specifically close gaps within education not covered under Title VII. Id. at 
544. 
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that Title VII is not the exclusive remedy for plaintiffs facing discrimination 
whether in the employment or educational realm.70 While the Supreme 
Court in 2005 recognized in Jackson v. Birmingham that Title IX and Title 
VII are vastly different statutes, the Court has yet to claim a preference for 
Title VII’s administrative procedure over Title IX’s singular remedial struc-
ture.71 While the parallels between Title IX and Title VII indicate that there 
are some overlapping legal theories, the Court’s continued expansive inter-
pretation of Title IX indicates the Third Circuit did not overreach by inter-
preting Title IX to apply to a medical residency program.72 
Significantly, the two circuit court opinions holding that Title VII does 
pre-empt Title IX were both decided over twenty years ago, pre-dating the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson.73 The Court in Jackson recognized that 
an employee had a right to bring a retaliation claim under Title IX even 
though he was not the target of gender discrimination.74 The Court reasoned 
that the lack of an express directive naming retaliation as a possible claim 
under Title IX did not bar the employee from bringing the claim.75 In con-
trast, in 1995, the Fifth Circuit in Lakoski v. James held that Title VII pre-
empted a Title IX claim, relying heavily on Title VII’s specific remedial pro-
cedure and the statute’s aim of conciliation, which was not apparent in Title 
IX.76 Thus, the Court’s holding in Jackson, along with more recent circuit 
                                                                                                                           
 70 See infra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing circuit opinions holding that Title VII 
does not pre-empt Title IX). 
 71 See Jackson v. Birmingham, 544 U.S. 167, 175 (2005) (finding that a plaintiff was not 
limited to Title VII when seeking relief for a retaliation claim on the basis of gender discrimina-
tion). 
 72 See id. at 174 (reversing the Circuit Court decision of no retaliation claim because Title IX 
is meant to have a broad construction); see also Gossett v. Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Regents for 
Langston Univ., 245 F.3d 1172, 1176 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding that courts generally review Title 
IX discrimination claims using Title VII’s legal analysis). 
 73 See Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Sch., 91 F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that Title VII 
pre-empted an employee’s Title IX and § 1983 discrimination claims and that Title IX pre-empted 
§ 1983 equal protection claims); Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
Title VII pre-empts Title IX employment discrimination claims); see also Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 
563 (declining to follow Lakoski and Waid because the decisions pre-dated the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Jackson, which expressly recognized an employee’s private right of action). 
 74 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 179. The Court held that a male coach of a girls basketball team who 
was fired for reporting the discrimination in how the teams were treated could bring a retaliation 
claim even if he was not the target of the original discrimination. Id. The Court reasoned that Title 
IX was meant to cover any person who complained about discriminatory practices, as the goal of 
Title IX is to prevent the use of federal dollars to support discrimination. Id. at 180. 
 75 See id. at 175 (concluding that Title IX’s broad directive permits a retaliation claim for 
speaking out against discriminatory practices and that Title VII’s specific language does not pre-
clude Title IX relief). 
 76 See Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753 (finding that Congress did not intend to offer plaintiffs an ave-
nue to bypass Title VII’s complex remedial procedure). But see Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 563 (declin-
ing to follow Lakoski because the decision pre-dated the Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson, 
which expressly recognized an employee’s right to bring a Title IX claim). 
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court decisions, including that of the Third Circuit, indicate a larger trend to-
ward broadening Title IX’s application.77 
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Fitzgerald v. Barn-
stable School Committee abrogated the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Waid v. 
Merrill Area Public Schools, by holding that Title IX was not the exclusive 
remedy for addressing gender discrimination in schools,  allowing an ele-
mentary school student and her parents to bring a § 1983  Equal Protection 
claim.78 The decision in Fitzgerald breaks with the Seventh Circuit’s analy-
sis in Waid, indicating that the Court will likely agree with the Third Cir-
cuit’s decision that a medical resident is not restricted to only bringing a 
Title VII claim.79 
As the remedial goal of Title VII is to make employees “whole” who 
have suffered harm, a key consideration in assessing the Third Circuit’s 
opinion is understanding that medical residents, unlike employees, cannot 
similarly be made whole through limited compensatory or punitive damag-
es, as they cannot practice medicine without graduating from a residency 
program.80 Therefore, Title IX, a proactive measure designed to protect res-
idents, provides a more efficient and effective means of due process than 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 563 (rejecting a narrow reading of Jackson by noting that the 
Court repeatedly endorsed Title IX’s broad application). Since the Court held a basketball coach, 
indirectly affected by discrimination, could bring a retaliation claim, the Court might disagree 
with the Fifth Circuit’s narrow holding in light of the Court’s application of Title IX. See Jackson, 
544 U.S. at 183 (finding that the Court broadly interpreted Title IX’s private cause of action since 
Cannon and Gebser). 
 78 Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 256 (2009) (comparing the substantive 
rights and remedies under Title IX and Equal Protection claims to conclude that Title IX’s nar-
rower application does not preclude broader § 1983 claims); see Waid, 91 F.3d at 862 (finding that 
an employee’s constitutional claims of equal protection are pre-empted under Title IX). The court 
surmised that Title IX’s enforcement mechanism of removing federal funds created a strong in-
centive for educational institutions to proactively comply with the statute and safeguard constitu-
tional rights. Waid, 91 F.3d at 862. Thus, the plaintiffs could not bring a claim under both statutes. 
Id. 
 79 See Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 258 (holding that Title IX does not pre-empt § 1983 Equal 
Protection claims). Central to the Court’s decision was the difference in protections afforded under 
Title IX, as the statute exempts some institutions, which could form the basis of a constitutional 
claim. Id. at 257. Additionally, the Court found that the variation in “remedial schemes” and dam-
ages indicated that § 1983 is a generally broader directive for protecting constitutional rights. Id. 
at 258. 
 80 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 564 (finding that plaintiffs may pursue protection against dis-
crimination under both Title VII and Title IX); Stewart R. Reuter, Professional Liability in Post-
graduate Medical Education, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 485, 485 (1994) (explaining that medical resi-
dents are akin to medical students and cannot become fully licensed physicians without success-
fully completing residency training); Lindsey Ferguson, Comment, Whistleblowing Is Not Just for 
Gym Class, Looking into the Past, Present and Future of Title IX, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 167, 191 
(2006) (discussing the differences in damages under Title VII and Title IX, as Title VII’s frame-
work sets a limit on the amount of compensatory and punitive damages available to the plaintiff). 
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Title VII’s retroactive focus on conciliation and settlement objectives.81 
Shortly after the passage of Title IX, in 1975 the Supreme Court recognized, 
in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., that Congress made both ad-
ministrative and judicial remedies available to those seeking relief.82 Alt-
hough the Johnson decision analyzed the differences between Title VII and 
§ 1983 Equal Protection claims, it is conceivable that the Supreme Court 
would similarly uphold the Third Circuit’s decision that a medical resident 
should be entitled to both Title VII’s administrative procedure and Title IX’s 
access to direct judicial relief.83 
Further, the Third Circuit’s decision aligns with the stated policy and 
legislative goals of Title IX to eradicate gender discrimination in educa-
tion.84 Although the Third Circuit did not address the question of whether 
Mercy actually received federal funds, Medicare is the largest financial con-
tributor to teaching hospitals’ residency programs.85 Thus, the Third Cir-
cuit’s decision to hold accountable those institutions that receive federal 
Medicare funds directly upholds Congress’ vision when it enacted Title IX 
to ensure equal access to higher education.86 
                                                                                                                           
 81 See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (finding that Title IX does 
not limit damages, allowing access to a full range of remedies). 
 82 See Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975) (holding that an em-
ployee is not limited to Title VII for relief in discrimination claims). 
 83 See id. at 461 (finding that Congress gave plaintiffs a valuable choice in deciding between 
administrative or judicial remedies). If the Third Circuit ruled that medical residents could not 
bring Title IX claims, it could have presented barriers for residents to obtain relief as a medical 
residency is determined by a “match system” using a computer algorithm to fill the limited num-
ber of spaces. See Medicare Resident Limits “Caps,” AAMC, https://www.aamc.org/advocacy/
gme/71178/gme_gme0012.html [https://perma.cc/F6GX-G6ZY] (explaining that the number of 
medical residency spots have been capped at 1996 levels since the passage of the Balanced Budget 
Act in 1997, potentially leading to shortages within the medical field). 
 84 See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text (discussing how Title IX was enacted to pro-
vide legal protection against gender discrimination in education). 
 85 See Mercy II, 850 F.3d at 558 (noting that this assumes Mercy receives federal funds as the 
hospital did not raise this claim in the initial proceeding); see also Amitabh Chandra et al., The 
Economics of Graduate Medical Education, NEW ENG. J. MED. (May 14, 2014), http://www.
nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1402468?query=featured_home& [https://perma.cc/LG7P-BVNQ] 
(noting that unlike medical students, medical residents are paid for their services). Medicare annu-
ally accounts for $9.5 billion in federal funds to teaching hospitals, $3 billion of which is directly 
used for medical education and resident salaries. Chandra, supra.  
 86 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the goal of Title IX to provide legal 
protection against discrimination for women in education by withdrawing federal funds from insti-
tutions found in violation). The ruling in Mercy II could pressure hospitals to provide safeguards 
against discrimination in order to retain needed funding. See Maria Castellecci, Hospitals’ Resi-
dency Programs Must Abide by Title IX, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Mar. 9, 2017), http://www.modern
healthcare.com/article/20170309/NEWS/170309885 [https://perma.cc/EQZ2-9CXK] (noting that 
the Mercy II decision impacts over seven-hundred teaching hospitals which rely on federal fund-
ing to train residents). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Third Circuit correctly applied a broad reading of Title IX by 
holding that a medical residency program is subject to Title IX’s reach and 
allowing a medical resident to bring a retaliation and quid pro quo claim 
under either Title IX or Title VII. While there has been much discussion on 
whether Title VII pre-empts Title IX in the employment context, Doe v. 
Mercy Catholic Medical Center presents a unique issue at the intersection 
of education and employment discrimination. It is evident from the legisla-
tive history surrounding the Educational Amendments of 1972 and the 
Courts expanding interpretation of Title IX that Congress intended Title IX 
to broadly apply to a variety of educational institutions rather than be con-
fined to the traditional educational realm of schooling. Unlike a full-time 
student whose sole recourse is Title IX or a full-time employee whose sole 
recourse is Title VII, the Third Circuit’s ruling in Mercy II allows residents 
the full panoply of legal protection and remedies available should they face 
discrimination. 
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